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THE EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL 
LLOYD K. GARRISON LECTURE 
 
 
Climate and Energy Policy in the Obama 
Administration 
JODY FREEMAN* 
 
I am very pleased to be here and honored because I recognize 
the importance of this lecture.  I know several of the people that 
have come before me and I am flattered to be included in their 
company.  I am also a big admirer of the Pace program.  You have 
been doing this much longer than many of the other law schools 
and you are well positioned to continue to be a leader in this do-
main for the future.  I want to especially thank the Dean and also 
Lin Harmon for all the trouble she has gone through to arrange 
this and, of course, Ann Powers for being such lovely hosts.  
Thank you very much for having me. 
What I thought I would do is give you a sense of the “state of 
the play” in energy and climate policy—where we are, how we got 
here, and then a little bit of discussion about what the future 
looks like.  Let me begin by talking about the current moment. 
As you know, I served as Counselor for Energy and Climate 
Change in the White House for the first part of the Administra-
tion when we were moving the climate bill in 2009 and 2010.  And 
as you are also well aware, the Waxman-Markey Bill, otherwise 
known as the American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES), 
got through the House but did not clear the Senate. 
 
*  Jody Freeman, J.D., was Counselor for Energy and Climate Change in the 
White House.  She was counselor and senior advisor to Carol Browner, the As-
sistant to the President for Energy and Climate Change.  Professor Freeman 
teaches at Harvard Law School.  She is the founding Director of the Harvard 
Law School Environmental Law Program.  Professor Freeman is a prominent 
scholar of administrative law and regulation.  She is a leading thinker on collab-
orative and contractual approaches to governance as well as one of the nation’s 
leading scholars of environmental law. 
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The first point is that the effort to pass comprehensive legis-
lation to cap carbon emissions and make a number of other ener-
gy reforms—the effort to accomplish this in a single package—
failed.  Secondly, in the wake of this failure, the President has 
called for making progress on climate and energy policy in what 
he has called “chunks,” including, most prominently, by passing a 
federal “clean energy standard.”  Yet so far the “chunks” strategy 
seems also to have come up short.  We have not seen a federal 
clean energy standard, although, as I will mention later, many 
states have adopted their own renewable energy portfolio stand-
ards.  Nor has Congress chosen to pass smaller bite-sized pieces 
of the more comprehensive bill by, for example, adopting a utility 
sector strategy to control greenhouse gases (GHGs). 
Third, and somewhat ironically, the common law as an ave-
nue for redress for harms caused by climate change has become 
extremely limited, if not entirely foreclosed on, by the Supreme 
Court decision last year in American Electric Power v. Connecti-
cut which held that the Clean Air Act precludes federal common 
law public nuisance claims.  Notably, this was an 8-0 decision in 
which Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the Court (Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor recused herself, since she had sat on the Second 
Circuit panel from which the case was appealed).  This decision 
followed predictably from the Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. 
EPA.  As the Court explained, by passing legislation comprehen-
sively addressing air pollution regulation, including GHG pollu-
tion, Congress had precluded federal common law claims.  So, in a 
way, this is the price of success—a victory on one front forecloses 
another. 
Fourth and finally, the international state of play is undergo-
ing something of a metamorphosis, evolving from the Kyoto style 
regime of legally binding targets and timetables into a different 
kind of regime consisting of “pledge and review,” meaning that 
countries will voluntarily make commitments to address GHGs 
that will be monitored and verified in some manner. 
That is essentially where we are.  I think of this in terms of 
three pendulum swings [gesturing to a power point slide].  The 
first such swing is from the legislative to the executive branch.  I 
think it is fair to say with the failure of a comprehensive climate 
and energy bill that the power has shifted at least temporarily, 
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and unless Congress acts, to the Executive Branch of the federal 
government.  And since 2009, the Executive Branch has done 
quite a bit with the authority that it possesses.  I will try to ex-
plain how the Administration has taken the reigns of the existing 
statutes and really tried to make progress on climate and energy 
goals despite congressional inaction.  The second pendulum shift 
is from federal to state.  In environmental law, momentum often 
goes back and forth from state to federal leadership as you know. 
There was a significant state effort to begin addressing cli-
mate change in the middle to late 2000s.  This was a really gen-
erative period for state climate and energy programs.  At the 
time, many people thought that the state programs, which in-
cluded early reporting programs, state trading schemes, perfor-
mance standards, and renewable energy requirements, would ul-
timately largely be replaced by a comprehensive federal regime.  
Some of the state and regional efforts anticipated a federal cap-
and-trade program, and were expressly designed to fold into it.  
The states went dormant for a couple of years—not entirely, but 
somewhat—anticipating that the federal government would take 
action.  Now that Congress has not passed legislation, we are see-
ing the momentum shift back to the states, at least temporarily. 
The final pendulum swing is away from a comprehensive ap-
proach, like the one in ACES, which included not just an econo-
my-wide cap-and-trade regime to reduce GHGS, but also incen-
tives for carbon capture and sequestration, a renewable energy 
standard, and a whole host of incentives and programs in the 
transportation, electricity, and industrial sectors.  It also envi-
sioned an important role for agriculture and forestry in providing 
carbon reduction credits, or “offsets,” to be purchased by sources 
covered by the cap.  That all-encompassing economy-wide ap-
proach has yielded to a more piecemeal step-by-step approach. 
I thought that I would summarize this in a user-friendly way, 
like magazines do, by telling you what’s “out” and what’s “in” 
[gesturing to a slide].  I am sure this is not entirely comprehen-
sive but it gives you a reasonably good overview.  Cap-and-trade 
is clearly out.  Taxes you may be surprised to hear—at least I 
could make an argument about this—could be in.  Other things 
might wind up being in too, like a clean energy standard.  Con-
gress is out.  People are not expecting much from Congress, cer-
3
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tainly in an election year, and it is difficult to see the pathway for 
Congress to pass anything as comprehensive as ACES, even after 
the election.  Inaction by Congress means that the Executive 
branch, the President, is in.  I will tell you the story of what the 
President has done so far with the tools he has, including the 
Clean Air Act.  In the international context, “targets and timeta-
bles” are out.  As you know, the Kyoto Protocol obligated only the 
developed economies to cut emissions an average of about 5% in a 
regime that was legally binding.  This has been only marginally 
successful, in part because it did not bind the developing world to 
commitments, even though they are a growing share of world 
emissions, or provide for technology transfer and other key pieces 
of the puzzle.  The Kyoto approach has yielded to a new frame-
work of “commitments” or pledges, which are to be monitored and 
reviewed. 
Coal is out.  As I will describe in more detail later, coal is los-
ing ground relative to other energy sources like natural gas for a 
number of reasons, including both economic and regulatory driv-
ers.  As coal-fired power plants are considering whether to refur-
bish, retrofit, or retire, the balance is tilting toward retirement.  
The economics of natural gas is a big part of that story and it is a 
big story indeed.  And finally, as you see here, “climate change” is 
out.  Energy, especially “clean energy,” is in.  The political rheto-
ric has shifted decisively in that direction.  No one, it seems, 
wants to talk about climate change. 
I want to turn now to the Executive Branch tools being de-
ployed in the absence of congressional action.  The primary 
mechanism, as you all know, is the Clean Air Act.  In the wake of 
Massachusetts v. EPA, which held that GHGs are a pollutant sub-
ject to regulation under the Act, EPA has begun to take steps to 
set standards.  In fact, we began doing this in the Administration 
even as the climate bill was moving through Congress, partly as a 
prod to Congress and partly as an insurance policy.  The first step 
following Massachusetts v. EPA was to make the finding about 
whether GHGs endanger public health and welfare and, if the 
answer was yes, to set GHG standards in the transportation sec-
tor (which is responsible for about 30% of U.S. emissions) and 
then ultimately to address emissions from stationary sources, in-
cluding coal-fired power plants, refineries, manufacturing, etc.  
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This set of regulations would come to be known as the “green-
house gas package.” 
The Agency has also pursued non-GHG regulation, however, 
which is just as important.  This is something that people some-
times overlook, but when EPA pays attention to its core tradi-
tional mission to regulate conventional pollutants (the National 
Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) pollutants, like NOx, 
SOx, and PM)—when EPA is regulating to protect the public 
health—it is simultaneously necessarily advancing GHG reduc-
tion goals because, of course, tighter regulation for conventional 
pollutants reduces all pollution including CO2 and other GHGs.  
Through a variety of rules that are proposed, or about to be pro-
posed, we see a more comprehensive strategy emerging, one that 
is designed to reduce GHGs across the board.  These include the 
Cross State Air Pollution Rule, which EPA redesigned after the 
D.C. Circuit struck down its first incarnation during the Bush 
Administration.  This rule deals with interstate transfers of NOx, 
SOx, and ozone.  EPA has also promulgated a toxics rule to con-
trol mercury, replacing another rule that had been struck down 
by the D.C. Circuit in the prior Administration.  In regulating 
toxics and cross-state pollution, EPA is necessarily also making 
plants more efficient and thus reducing GHGs. 
The most important policy initiative of the Obama Admin-
istration thus far, however, is historic fuel efficiency standards 
set jointly by EPA and the Department of Transportation, or 
more specifically the National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration (NHTSA).  Full disclosure is required here: I led the 
White House effort, so I am probably going to be somewhat biased 
when I talk about its beneficial effects.  But I think it is fair to 
say, and many others have said, that this policy is the Admin-
istration’s most important accomplishment in the energy, climate, 
and environmental domain.  Certainly it is the most aggressive, 
most ambitious effort to improve fuel efficiency in the history of 
the United States.  The so-called “national auto policy” (also 
known as “the car deal”) combines the first ever federal GHG 
standards set by EPA with NHTSA’s traditional authority to set 
fuel economy standards.  The challenge in creating this policy 
was to figure out a way for EPA, which is authorized to set emis-
sions standards under the Clean Air Act, and NHTSA, which is 
5
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authorized to set Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) 
standards under the Energy Conservation laws, to row in the 
same direction and set a single set of harmonized standards. 
Complicating this task was the political imperative of ensur-
ing that the federal standards would garner the support of Cali-
fornia, which had gone ahead during the Bush Administration 
and promulgated their own GHG standards for passenger cars 
and trucks.  California had at the time sought a preemption 
waiver from EPA, which is required under the Clean Air Act if it 
wished to set more stringent standards than the federal govern-
ment.  The Bush Administration denied the waiver.  Yet, during 
the 2008 presidential campaign, candidate Obama had said that 
his EPA would reconsider that waiver request.  In addition, four-
teen other states were poised to adopt California’s standards if 
the waiver were granted.  Thus, if implemented, the California 
standards would govern 40% of the car market. 
This would have created a costly and complicated patchwork 
of regulation.  In the states that had not adopted California 
standards, auto manufacturers would have been subject to a fed-
eral CAFE standard set by NHTSA (the traditional fuel economy 
standard expressed in miles per gallon) and new GHG pollution 
standards set separately by EPA (in grams per mile).  At the 
same time, in the states that had adopted California’s standards, 
there would be even stricter GHG standards.  Further complicat-
ing matters, the auto industry had launched over a dozen 
preemption lawsuits challenging California’s legal authority to 
set these GHG standards.  The industry argued that California 
was preempted by the federal CAFE statute, which gives exclu-
sive authority to set fuel economy standards to NHTSA.  The En-
ergy Policy Conservation Act says that anything “related” to fuel 
efficiency is preempted, so industry argued that California’s GHG 
standards amounted to an indirect effort to usurp the exclusive 
federal power to set fuel economy standards since the only way to 
reduce GHGs is by improving vehicle fuel efficiency. 
So when the President took office, California was expecting to 
get its waiver of federal preemption with fourteen states poised to 
adopt its program; industry preemption litigation trying to block 
this effort was pending in federal appeals courts; EPA, for the 
first time, was about to exercise its authority to set federal GHG 
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standards; and NHTSA was under a deadline to promulgate its 
next five-year round of CAFE standards.  In the face of all this, 
we sought to produce a single national standard that would satis-
fy the President’s environmental commitments, satisfy the two 
federal agencies and their legal requirements, satisfy California, 
and ensure the support of the auto industry.  And we also had to 
consider the autoworkers union (the UAW), the states, and the 
environmental groups.  I can tell you that working through all of 
these legal, regulatory, and political complications was like play-
ing six-dimensional chess blindfolded. 
And yet, amazingly, we succeeded.  The first round of these 
standards, which apply to model years 2012-2016, will achieve 
35.5 mpg by 2016 putting us on a path of fuel efficiency that we 
have never experienced—an average of about 5% improvement 
per year.  Based on the template that we established in that first 
round, the Administration signed everyone up for a second round 
from 2017-2025, which will ultimately achieve 54.5 mpg, or about 
double our current fuel efficiency.  This is a real achievement.  
The standards are projected to save four billion barrels of oil be-
tween 2017 and 2025, cut carbon emissions two billion metric 
tons, and save folks at the pump over the lifetime of their vehicles 
up to $4,400.  So this is a win-win-win for the environment, the 
industry, and for governance. 
Notably, all of this happened via voluntary agreement, not as 
part of a legally binding settlement and without the imprimatur 
of a court.  The auto industry filed “letters of commitment” with 
the regulatory agencies (the EPA and the Department of Trans-
portation) in which they promised not to challenge the new 
standards if they ultimately looked substantially like what was 
initially proposed by the agencies in a “notice of intent.” 
This advance pledge not to litigate was remarkable given the 
history of litigation over CAFE standards.  The industry did this 
because the trade for them was worth it—federal uniformity and 
one-stop compliance in exchange for their assent.  And they felt 
comfortable after extensive discussions with the agencies, which 
reassured them that they would be able to comply.  The new 
standards provide considerable compliance flexibility by allowing 
the companies to earn and trade credits both within and between 
fleets.  They also ramp up stringency over time, at a reasonable 
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pace, allowing the industry time to adjust.  And perhaps most 
importantly, they gave the industry certainty, clarity, and pre-
dictability by replacing a patchwork of regulation, which was a 
far less appealing scenario.  I am now more certain than ever, af-
ter this experience, that industry is actually less concerned about 
stringency most of the time and much more concerned about clar-
ity and predictability so they can plan their investments going 
forward.  What the Administration was able to give them was 
clarity about the regulatory trajectory first to 2016 and then out 
to 2025, so they could focus on building the cars of what we all 
hope will be a cleaner energy future. 
At the same time California promised in its letter of com-
mitment not to implement its own program, even if EPA granted 
the waiver.  As the President had promised, EPA did reconsider 
the waiver, decided that the legal foundation for denying it was 
wrong, and reversed that denial.  California said, “[t]hank you 
very much, we appreciate the legal entitlement to regulate but we 
agree to stand down and accept compliance with the new federal 
program as compliance with our program.”  Finally, as part of 
this package the auto industry also agreed, although somewhat 
reluctantly, to drop all of its preemption litigation—over a dozen 
suits were stayed and then ultimately dropped. 
It is especially interesting that these letters of commitment 
are not, strictly speaking, legal documents.  They are instead very 
detailed tit-for-tat agreements that say: if you do what you prom-
ised to do, we will do as we promised, one step at a time, one after 
the other.  This is essentially a “trust but verify” regime.  This is 
a rather creative mechanism for memorializing the agreement.  
The uniqueness of this was driven home recently when I went to 
the D.C. Circuit to see the oral argument in the GHG litigation, 
in which these standards, along with EPA’s endangerment find-
ing and other GHG related rules, are being challenged by a coali-
tion of industry groups.1  There, in the ceremonial courtroom, was 
a sea of lawyers sitting at the counsel table on the industry side.  
On the other side was, of course, the government, along with the 
 
 1. Subsequent to this lecture, the four challenged rules, known collectively 
as the “greenhouse gas package,” were upheld by the D.C. Circuit. See Coal for 
Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 09-1322, 2012 WL 2381955 (D.C. Cir. June 
26, 2012). 
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state and environmental intervenors, plus one lone guy who rep-
resented the auto industry.  If you have any sense of the thirty-
plus years of conflict over fuel efficiency between the auto indus-
try and the environmentalists and states, to see counsel for the 
auto industry standing on the side of the government and saying 
EPA got this right was a remarkable experience. 
Of course, a necessary result of setting the first binding 
standard for GHGs under the Clean Air Act is that it automati-
cally triggers permit requirements in other programs under the 
Act.  So issuing this GHG standard for mobile sources tilted the 
first domino in what was a self-executing series of dominos that 
led inexorably to regulation of stationary sources as well.  Under 
the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program, new 
or modified stationary sources must obtain permits and apply 
best available control technology to all “regulated” pollutants, 
now including GHGs.  This creates an enormous management 
challenge for EPA and the state permitting agencies, since the 
statute requires sources that emit as few as 250 or 100 tons per 
year of a regulated pollutant to meet these standards.  The low 
thresholds applied to GHGs would result in many thousands and 
perhaps millions of new permit applicants compared to the few 
hundred of sources that must get permits now.  Faced with this, 
EPA has sought to raise the thresholds temporarily administra-
tively, phasing in the program and requiring permits initially for 
only the very largest emitters.  The rule EPA adopted to imple-
ment this approach, known as the “tailoring rule,” is, as a result, 
at least temporarily a deregulatory measure.  But the question is 
whether EPA has the legal authority to adjust these statutory 
thresholds on their rationale, which is that there is an “adminis-
trative necessity.”  This rule too is part of the litigation I men-
tioned, in which a coalition of industry is challenging the EPA’s 
package or GHG related rules. 
In addition to these Clean Air Act mechanisms for addressing 
GHGs, the Administration has used other federal levers to make 
progress on climate change and advance its clean energy goals.  
For example, the Department of Energy has intensified its effort 
to set appliance standards, which will result in billions of dollars 
in cost savings and reduced environmental impacts once they are 
all implemented.  This process, which is governed by a longstand-
9
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ing consent decree, was proceeding very slowly in the Bush Ad-
ministration, but the Obama Administration picked up the pace 
because of the significant potential for both environmental bene-
fits and cost savings. 
At the same time, the Department of the Interior has accel-
erated siting renewable energy projects on federal lands, both on-
shore and offshore.  The onshore process was improved through 
another collaborative exercise that brought nine federal agencies 
together to streamline a complicated approval process.  These 
agencies either have jurisdiction over the relevant federal lands, 
or possess regulatory authority over siting.  As a result of the 
many players, the permit process can be lengthy, costly, and re-
dundant.  So we hammered out a memorandum of understanding 
among the agencies to accelerate and simplify permitting for re-
newables without sacrificing environmental standards, simply by 
designating a lead agency and requiring consolidated, integrated 
reviews.  This is a quiet kind of accomplishment that few people 
notice, but it could make a big difference.  And it was motivated 
by the idea that if Congress will not pass legislation, we will at 
least get our federal house in order using the authorities and ju-
risdictional powers we have and, in this case, accelerate clean en-
ergy development on federal lands. 
In addition, the Department of Energy has made significant 
investments in renewable energy technology, from advanced bat-
teries, to “smart grid” systems, to promising biofuels that are at 
such an early stage of development that they cannot always at-
tract private capital.  A significant portion of this funding came 
from the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act, which made 
the biggest investment in the energy sector in U.S. history.  De-
pending on how you count, sixty to ninety billion dollars of the 
Recovery Act went into supporting clean energy and energy effi-
ciency. 
Then there is the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), which, although not an executive branch agency, has 
taken steps in line with Administration priorities to modify 
transmission policy and make it friendlier to renewable energy.  
For example, FERC has proposed a rule to help integrate renew-
able energy into the grid and promote transmission planning that 
would consider not just reliability issues and economic concerns, 
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but other public policy matters like climate change and environ-
mental impacts. 
This list of agency initiatives is not complete, but it gives you 
a sense of the kinds of things you can do under existing statutes 
with the executive power the government already possesses and 
by enlisting independent agencies.  To see the entire picture 
though, it is important to also consider state and regional efforts.  
I want to save sufficient time for questions so I will not go 
through them in great detail but I just want to list a number of 
initiatives that are currently underway: the regional GHG initia-
tive (RGGI), which is the first regional cap-and-trade system in 
the United States; California’s Global Warming Solutions Act un-
der which the state Air Resources board has established both a 
state-wide cap-and-trade system and a low carbon fuel standard; 
and renewable portfolios standards which have been adopted by 
over thirty states.  There are a variety of other state level 
measures too, at some stage of development. 
Not all of these efforts have been successful, however.  For 
example the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Accord, which was so 
promising in the middle part of the 2000s, has now been informal-
ly suspended.  New Jersey pulled out of RGGI.  So the states are 
in a state of flux at the moment.  The real question is, assuming 
the existing state and federal programs are reasonably successful, 
how much progress could you make in an admittedly piecemeal 
approach to GHG reductions?  This assumes using the executive 
power pro-actively, combined with state and regional efforts that 
might be reenergized in the absence of leadership by the Con-
gress.  How much does it add up to?  When I was in the Admin-
istration we discussed this and tried to make these projections.  
Conveniently, the World Resource Institute did the very same ex-
ercise and published their results.  They describe three scenarios.  
The first scenario is the least ambitious and predicts limited suc-
cess with the measures I described, resulting in 5% reduction in 
GHGs by 2030.  The middle scenario, which is somewhat more 
ambitious and assumes greater implementation and compliance, 
predicts 18% reduction of GHGs by 2030.  The most ambitious 
scenario, which assumes full implementation and compliance, 
predicts 27% GHG reduction by 2030. 
11
  
386 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  30 
 
The problem is that if you are on a path to 85% GHG reduc-
tion by 2050—which is projected to be necessary to avoid a great-
er than two degree Celsius temperature rise—in order to get on 
that pathway, by 2030 you need to be somewhere between 51% 
and 64% below 2005 levels.  And the most ambitious, most ag-
gressive, most hopeful scenario in the WRI analysis, (which 
frankly just has to be unrealistic given what we know about im-
plementation and enforcement) produces only a 27% reduction. 
So the happy story I began to tell you about the federal gov-
ernment using the power it possesses, and the states re-engaging 
as the pendulum swings their way, is not necessarily as happy a 
story as we need to have.  For the most positive projections to be 
a reality requires a lot to go right: the states have to deliver on 
their promises; the states have to not run out of money before 
they deliver on their promises; the regional efforts that are not 
yet up and running need to get up and running; once up and run-
ning they need to be operational and successful; the federal gov-
ernment must maintain the path it is on and these initiatives 
must be stable across administrations as they change, which is a 
big expectation; there can be no major legal problems (which is 
fanciful since every major rule the EPA promulgates in this do-
main tends to be challenged); and we have to expect that we will 
continue to come out of the recession in a way that will not un-
dermine any of these programs.  This is a lot to expect given the 
history of litigation and the slow implementation of environmen-
tal standards and rules. 
The second-to-last thing I wanted to talk about are the legal 
challenges we face.  I have described to you the litigation in the 
D.C. Circuit challenging EPA’s implementation of the Clean Air 
Act.  There are already legal challenges to the state initiatives, 
and more will come, under the dormant commerce clause.  And 
we are also seeing trade related challenges to state clean energy 
programs as violating World Trade Organization (WTO) law.  If 
the states promote renewable energy in a way that either reaches 
extraterritorially into other states by seeking to regulate their 
energy production, or in a way that tries to hoard renewable en-
ergy for their own state, or in a way that discriminates in inter-
state commerce, they will be struck down as violating the 
dormant commerce clause.  In addition, the so-called “green trade 
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war” between China and the United States has led to allegations 
that state efforts to promote clean energy are illegal subsidies 
under WTO law.  States have to worry then not just about domes-
tic constitutional challenges, but also to charges that they are un-
lawfully subsidizing clean energy in violation of U.S. trade 
agreements.  These are very substantial legal challenges.  At a 
minimum they can cause a lot of delay, and delay as you know, is 
the enemy of GHG regulation and the prospects for mitigating the 
worst impacts of climate change. 
Finally, I think the most important question right now is: 
what does an integrated energy and climate policy look like?  It is 
very hard to put together an energy policy that promotes what 
everyone calls energy independence, is good for national security, 
and also goes in the right direction to address climate change.  
One can fairly easily come up with an energy policy that is good 
for national security and energy independence and that ignores 
climate change, but it becomes much more challenging to produce 
an integrated plan.  And this puts environmentalists in a very 
uncomfortable situation where they have to make difficult 
tradeoffs.  For example, the environmental community has tradi-
tionally opposed nuclear power, but nuclear power of course takes 
on a very different valence when we consider it in light of our 
goals to produce low carbon energy.  After all, nuclear energy 
happens to be a zero carbon source even if, because it relies on 
uranium, it is not renewable. 
So one has to begin working out how one feels about issues 
that environmentalists long thought were settled.  We knew who 
was on the right side and we knew who was on the wrong side 
and now that is all up for grabs.  This is also true of natural gas.  
Natural gas is seen as an essential bridge fuel with lower carbon 
intensity than coal and far fewer air pollution impacts.  We are 
currently facing an unprecedented supply of natural gas located 
in tight shale rock, which we now can reach through horizontal 
drilling and hydraulic fracturing. 
The question is how should one feel about this?  If one simply 
opposes both fracking and nuclear energy, what energy sources 
are we left with?  Wind, solar, and geothermal energy are a tiny 
percentage of our energy mix at the moment, and hydropower, at 
least in this country, is largely tapped out.  On the transportation 
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side, the energy supply is almost 100% oil; and biofuels, despite 
the federal production mandate embodied in EPA’s renewable 
fuels standard, are in their infancy.  Energy demand is going to 
be more than 53% greater by 2030 globally and is projected to 
double by 2050.  I want you to think about that.  We are 85% de-
pendent on fossil fuels.  Even if you dramatically incentivize re-
newable energy, even if you make tremendous strides promoting 
wind and solar, including figuring out storage strategies, and 
build a transmission to deliver them from remote locations to the 
load centers, even if you invest in energy efficiency (the first best 
thing to do) and aggressively promote biofuels production, in the 
face of global energy demand, you cannot close the gap anytime 
soon. 
So we are dependent on fossil fuels for the foreseeable future 
and the question is how might we develop an energy strategy that 
deals with that reality and at the same time transitions us into a 
cleaner future with a more sustainable trajectory over time?  
That is very challenging.  The EPA regulations that I described to 
you, including the GHG-specific regulations and the traditional 
EPA standards for conventional air pollution, are helping to drive 
coal retirement faster than people anticipated.  Some people say 
20% of the coal fleet will retire by 2020, others say up to 30%.  
This is a very important dynamic.  Indeed, it is a GHG strategy.  
It may be a little opaque, but the combination of what EPA is do-
ing under the Clean Air Act and the underlying fundamentals 
(the economics) is driving a switch to gas from coal.  From a cli-
mate change perspective that is a positive development.  One 
cannot be against everything.  One has to be for something and, 
in the current context, this shift should be seen as good news. 
The question is always what’s next?  From the bridge fuel 
now where do you go?  Of course the most essential ingredient of 
a sensible policy is a price on carbon because without such a price 
we cannot make renewables and other cleaner energy sources 
more competitive; they cannot compete unless we actually put a 
price on the negative climate related externalities, now being 
consumed for free, of fossil energy.  In the absence of a tax or a 
cap or some other mechanism for pricing carbon, we are doing 
these other things I described, but one cannot escape the need, ul-
timately, to price the thing that we treat as free, but which is 
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not—the production of CO2, methane, and other global warming 
gases. 
I think the story I am trying to tell you is a story of accom-
plishing something and making progress with the tools you have 
but ultimately confronting the need to do something much more 
significant.  The question before us is what does that policy look 
like?  What are the tools we are going to need whether we pass 
them through Congress, through the states and regions or use ex-
ecutive power to try to accomplish them?  Ultimately, what legal 
and physical infrastructure can we build to make that happen?  
Right now we do not have the regulatory tools and incentives we 
need to produce a clean energy economy.  We do not, for example, 
have an adequate system to regulate fracking to ensure that it is 
done safely and responsibly.  We are in the middle of a transition 
regarding our regulatory approach to offshore drilling, and we are 
at a moment when the Arctic is beginning to be opened up and we 
do not yet have the data or information we need to know with 
reasonable confidence that we can drill there safely and in an en-
vironmentally protective manner.  Likewise, we do not yet have a 
liability regime for carbon capture and sequestration (CCS).  
Even if we could produce CCS at scale in an economic way, which 
is an open question, we do not have a legal regime that addresses 
liability as we do for the nuclear industry, for example. 
My point is: we do not have the legal regime we need.  The 
Clean Air Act, although a marvelous tool, and although I think 
the EPA is being quite reasonable with it, is essentially limited.  
It cannot do everything necessary on GHG regulation, and cer-
tainly not cost-effectively, in its current form.  Right now, the best 
approach to regulating GHGs under the Clean Air Act is to use 
the New Source Performance Standard program, through which 
EPA sets best available technology standards on an industrial 
category basis.  Yet this program is limited because it addresses 
only new and modified sources and only very indirectly requires 
states to submit plans for existing sources.  And there appears to 
be no authority for EPA to use a cap-and-trade program, which, 
believe me, they would like to do, to reduce the costs of GHG re-
ductions. 
So I am telling you a story of imperfection in the existing 
tools.  At some point we have to build a new legal infrastructure 
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to go with what we hope will be a new physical and technological 
infrastructure for a cleaner energy age.  That is the picture and 
the challenge I want to leave you with.  I suppose my account 
might strike you as a little depressing, in the sense that some of 
us thought we would be further along by now; some of us thought 
that the consensus and political will on climate change had 
gelled.  Yet my story is still somewhat hopeful I think, about our 
ability to make at least some progress, by taking advantage of the 
drivers that we still have, if we know how to use them well.   
 
Thank you. 
 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/9
